

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) (17-05-2014)		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Training Regionally Aligned Brigades in USPACOM		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)  Major Jason M. Wingear  Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. Reference: DOD Directive 5230.24					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT  U.S. Army doctrine now outlines two core competencies; Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. As the Army moves into the 21 <sup>st</sup> century, the training balance between the two must be determined. Based on the advent of Regionally Aligned Brigades the training balance is now determined by the respective Geographic Combatant Commander, who will employ those brigades. This paper specifically looks at the historical Army bias towards training for Combined Arms Maneuver. Next, the paper looks at the current threats in the United States Pacific Commander's Area of Responsibility. Then, the paper analyzes the Operational Factors of time, space, and force for the USPACOM commander to help determine the training balance. Once these three areas are analyzed it is clear that USPACOM Regionally Aligned Brigades should weight their training effort in favor of Wide Area Security. Finally, three recommendations are made in order to institute this training plan.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Wide Area Security, Regionally Aligned Brigades, PACOM, training					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  23	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.**

**Training Regionally Aligned Brigades in USPACOM**

**by**

**Jason M. Wingart**

**Major, US Army**

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**17 May 2014**

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Counterargument</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Main Body</b>	<b>5</b>
Training Bias.....	6
Threats.....	8
Operational Factors .....	12
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Selected Bibliography</b>	<b>18</b>

## **Abstract**

U.S. Army doctrine now outlines two core competencies; Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. As the Army moves into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the training balance between the two must be determined. Based on the advent of Regionally Aligned Brigades the training balance is now determined by the respective Geographic Combatant Commander who will employ those brigades. This research specifically looks at the historical Army bias towards training for Combined Arms Maneuver. Next, it looks at the current threats in the United States Pacific Commander's Area of Responsibility. Then, it analyzes the Operational Factors of time, space, and force for the USPACOM commander to help determine the training balance. Once these three areas are analyzed it is clear that USPACOM Regionally Aligned Brigades should weight their training effort in favor of Wide Area Security. Finally, three recommendations are made in order to institute this training plan.

## Introduction

The slogan and Army principle of “train as you fight” has guided service training for decades. It originated as a by-product of the United States Army preparing to face the Soviet Union during the Cold War in a type of war emphasizing Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM), similar to the character of warfare conducted during both World War II and Korea.<sup>1</sup> “CAM is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.”<sup>2</sup> The training time spent on CAM by the U.S. Army over nearly four decades resulted in a swift, crushing military victory over Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s. This military victory, in essence, validated the U.S. Army training model throughout the remainder of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army only saw what it wanted to see. Throughout that same period of time, the world experienced more low intensity conflicts than conventional ones. In order to be successful in one of these non-traditional conflicts, militaries must employ a Wide Area Security (WAS) military effort. “WAS is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.”<sup>3</sup> Even the defeat of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War, where it attempted to apply a CAM approach at the operational and strategic levels instead of a WAS

---

1. Morgan Sheeran, “Approaching Doctrinal Training the Army Way,” *Small Wars Journal*, last modified September 10, 2010, accessed March 28, 2014, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/534-sheeran.pdf>.

2. U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-9.

3. Ibid., 2-9.

effort failed to make a change in the Army training strategy. Immediately after the defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. Army watched the Soviet Union for another ten years fail against the Afghans while the Soviet's applied a CAM instead of a WAS approach.

As a result, the U.S. Army was still ready and willing to execute a CAM campaign as the new millennia began. In Afghanistan, it was not the U.S. Army who overthrew the Taliban through a CAM approach, instead it was the Northern Alliance backed with U.S. military and government assistance that was the decisive effort. After the change in power, the U.S. Army became engaged in a predominately WAS fight. In a slightly different manner, the U.S. Army was required to invade Iraq using CAM warfare. However, that type of warfare literally lasted only weeks before the Army transitioned to a conflict that required a WAS approach for the next eight years. Yet, even throughout the Global War on Terror, highlighted by both campaigns, U.S. Army units resisted the transition from training on CAM to WAS even though each unit received a WAS mission to execute once deployed. Now that the U.S. Army is out of Iraq and the Afghanistan Theater is winding down, the Army once again faces the dilemma of how to train the force for the next fight.

Complicating this situation further, for the first time, the U.S. Army announced the plan to create Regionally Align Brigades (RAB) within a respective Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) in order to "better support the needs of each combatant commander . . . to generate individual Soldiers and organizations who are better trained for specific regions of the world."<sup>4</sup> With respect to a RAB, the GCC now determines the mission and therefore the training required to meet that mission. In 2012 the U.S. Government, followed by the U.S.

---

4. Steve Griffin, "Regionally Aligned Brigades: There's More to this Plan than Meets the Eye," *Small Wars Journal*, last modified September 19, 2012, accessed March 28, 2014, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/regionally-aligned-brigades-theres-more-to-this-plan-than-meets-the-eye>.

Military, announced the now famous rebalance to Asia, better known as the “pivot to Asia.” This shift of emphasis to Asia for the military places the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) as the highest priority Combatant Command now and into the future. Therefore, the question to be asked is how should USPACOM balance the training for U.S. Army RABs? In this respect, USPACOM designated RABs should focus their training primarily towards WAS.

### **Counterargument**

Most senior Army officers, including the Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, argue that a major focus on WAS training is completely the wrong strategy for three reasons. First, U.S. Army doctrine and the USPACOM strategy both clearly articulate the requirement to execute across the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO), which encompasses both CAM and WAS. Second, CAM skills are currently the most atrophied and carry with it the most risk to national security if the U.S. Army is not properly prepared to win a high intensity conventional war. Third, the anticipated USPACOM threats in the region require a CAM approach.

Both CAM and WAS fall underneath the Army Core Competencies. Additionally, doctrine states that both are “inseparable and simultaneous,” which specifically highlights the necessity of the Army RABs to be able to execute both core competencies with equal effectiveness, not one prioritized over the other.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the USPACOM strategy specifically states “we will ensure we are ready to respond rapidly and effectively across the

---

5. U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 2-8.

full Range of Military Operations.”<sup>6</sup> Thereby, USPACOM has already clearly delineated the requirement of all its forces, to include RABs, to be able to execute both CAM and WAS. This doctrinal basis and GCC strategy articulate the combined training effort required by all USPACOM designated RABs to be proficient at both Army Core Competencies.

After more than ten years of the U.S. Army training and operating underneath the Global War on Terror (GWOT) mission that predominately required a WAS approach, the CAM skills of the U.S. Army are currently the most atrophied.<sup>7</sup> This deficiency in the force was identified a couple of years ago and precipitated the change at the National Training Centers to transition units not preparing for a GWOT deployment to execute training rotations focused on CAM. The time necessary to reach the level of proficiency required for CAM warfare is lengthy and will take a steady approach over at least the remainder of this decade to reacquire. Moreover, as the Israelis learned during their 2006 war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, a CAM war is significantly more costly in terms of lives, money, and the failure to achieve strategic objectives if the force is ill-prepared.<sup>8</sup> For that reason, not quickly reacquiring the CAM skills puts the U.S. at a higher level of risk.

The final aspect that supports at least a balanced approach towards the training methodology for a RAB assigned to USPACOM is the perceived threats in the region. The

---

6. U.S. Pacific Command, <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/2013-uspacom-strategy.shtml>.

7. Raymond Odierno, *Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review*, 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Committee on the Armed Services United States House of Representatives, September 18, 2013, 3.

8. William Benson, *Major Combat Operations versus Stability Operations: Getting Army Priorities Correct*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2011, 42.



first threat and most obvious to all is North Korea, who the U.S. is technically still at war with. The Korean War was defined by the maneuver warfare conducted by both sides during the conflict, which eventually ended in the stalemate that creates the current standoff at the Demilitarized Zone. The provocations of North Korea in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century alone, which include the sinking of the *Cheonan*, the Yeopyeong Island artillery shelling, and the nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, all point to the necessity to maintain a force capable of winning a conventional war against North Korea. The second perceived threat in the region is the emergence of China as a rising military power, suggestive of the great power transition theory that great powers must go to war against one another eventually.<sup>9</sup> The Anti-Access/Area Denial defense system that China has developed and the U.S. military's response concept of Air-Sea Battle frame the potential conflict as obviously a CAM campaign. Finally, the fact that seven of the ten largest standing militaries in the world reside within the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) demands CAM proficiency for the U.S. military.<sup>10</sup>

### **Main Body**

While the majority of the current literature supports the balanced or a more CAM training methodology, that approach is flawed for three reasons. First, there is legacy favoritism towards CAM training that exists within the U.S. Army and prevents a balanced training approach. Second, the anticipated threat for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in USPACOM is the hybrid threat, which will employ the RAB in more WAS type operations than CAM. Third,

---

9. David Lai, *The United States and China in Power Transition*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011, 26.

10. Samuel Locklear, *U.S. Pacific Command Posture*. Presentation before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C. March 5, 2013, 3.

the analysis of the operational factors of time, space, and force support WAS training more than CAM. Once these three reasons are properly understood it is clear that the preponderance of training for U.S. Army RABs, in the USPACOM Area of Operation, should be focused on WAS.

### **Training Bias**

“Throughout its history, the Army has been called upon to execute operations outside of its traditional mission of attack and defend.”<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, those operations in the recent past have been met with hesitancy and resistance by the service.

Traditionally, the US military has not regarded stability operations as a ‘core’ mission with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations. The American military has traditionally focused on conventional warfighting as its most important mission, and while few officers have challenged the Clausewitzian axiom that wars are the ‘continuation of policy by other means,’ a pervasive belief maintains that, once an enemy’s conventional forces have been defeated, the responsibility of the military for helping the policy makers achieve the broader objectives for which the hostilities were conducted has been largely fulfilled. . . . In other words, it’s the military’s responsibility to win the war, not to win the peace.<sup>12</sup>

However, Joint Doctrine clearly states that “success is not only defined in military terms; it also involves rebuilding infrastructure, supporting economic development, establishing the rule of law, building accountable governance, establishing essential services, and building a capable host nation military responsible to civilian authority.”<sup>13</sup> It further goes on to state that in the absence of other governmental

---

11. Jerome Hawkins, *Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21st Century Challenges*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2008, 24.

12. Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006, 21.

13. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations*, Washington DC: CJCS, 29 September 2011, I-1.

assistance, the U.S. military is charged to execute these stability functions, thus the Army must be able to win the peace.<sup>14</sup> Both Iraq and Afghanistan are excellent examples of the Army being charged with winning the peace. While there were brief periods in both theaters of operations where CAM operations were executed by U.S. forces, the majority of the time was spent conducting WAS.

Even though the overseas operational balance was heavily in favor of WAS the training balance at home was not. Based on the time and resource constraints as well as the institutional knowledge, the Army continued to favor CAM training for deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. With units only having roughly one to one-and-half years between deployments there was insufficient time to train for both CAM and WAS tasks. As a result, most units focused on CAM training while at home station because there was a lack of knowledge and the resources were not available to properly train WAS tasks.<sup>15</sup> Those WAS tasks were instead pushed off and trained at the one month long Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) at one of the Combat Training Centers (CTC). So even in a scenario where units knew they would be executing a WAS mission, they spent the majority of their training time on CAM operations. “Stability and reconstruction missions have been secondary to preparation for the traditional missions of offense and defense.”<sup>16</sup> This type of institutional

---

14. Ibid., III-31.

15. Based on the author’s experience, personnel turnover was the primary reason there was a lack of knowledge in units while at home station. When units returned, the majority of the leadership would leave within the first 90 days and would not receive replacement leadership until the unit was within 90 days of the next deployment.

16. Hawkins, *Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges*, 23.

bias reduced unit effectiveness in the WAS conflicts the U.S. was engaged in and will continue to do so in the future if it is not corrected.

In the future this bias will further exasperate the issue of training WAS tasks as CTCs revert back to training for CAM operations. This strategic training decision is already being implemented for any units not deploying to Afghanistan. However, as mentioned above, the primary venue for training WAS tasks were executed at CTC rotations due to the resource constraints at home station training locations. If the Army removes the primary locations that have the time and resources dedicated to train WAS then there will be a reduction in future capability to perform WAS globally. Based on the historical bias of the U.S. military and large conventional armies in general, this is a real possibility and will push the U.S. Army towards a one dimensional force, again.

## **Threats**

In theory, the idea of “train as you fight” only works if one knows the upcoming character of the conflict. In order to determine how the Army should train now, it must first determine what type of threat it anticipates fighting in the future. While the debate of against whom and where the next conflict/war will occur, it is generally accepted within the military that the challenge to be faced will be a hybrid threat. “A hybrid threat is a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”<sup>17</sup> This type of warfare consists of both conventional and unconventional warfare, where the simultaneous application of both CAM and WAS operations will be required.

---

17. U.S. Department of the Army, *Training Circulation 7-100: Hybrid Threat*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010, iv.

At first glance, this type of threat seems to support a balanced approach towards training. However, U.S. adversaries around the world also collected lessons learned on U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, which was a hybrid war as evident by the overlap of both irregular and regular warfare. Future potential adversaries learned to engage the U.S. in a conventional manner only when they possessed the initiative and/or surprise. Examples of a few highly successful conventional attacks include those against static defensive positions at Wanat, Observation Post Bari Ali, and Combat Out-Post Keating. In each case, these engagements were of limited duration. However, these same units conducted primarily stability operations both before and after these short duration conventional attacks for the remaining yearlong deployment. This demonstrates the point that U.S. forces will probably find themselves spending more time conducting WAS operations than CAM in the future. It also highlights the necessity to not allow the CAM skills to atrophy completely because they were and still are necessary in a hybrid threat environment.

The easiest threat to identify within the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is North Korea. Most individuals would argue that a war with North Korea would be primarily a conventional fight, however, that analysis is short sighted and fails to account for a number of long lasting issues that will remain once and if a conventional fight occurs. North Korea is replete with numerous internal human security issues that will take decades to stabilize whether it collapses on its own or whether a conventional fight occurs first. “Containing the hazards associated with the collapse of a nuclear state, restoring responsible control over its arsenal, reestablishing essential stability; halting and reversing widespread civil violence” to include the massive food security issues are just a few threats that the U.S., its regional partners, and the international community would face when confronted with a failed North

Korean state.<sup>18</sup> The length of time spent winning the peace in North Korea will likely be proportional to the level of training and expertise within the U.S. military and its regional partners to conduct WAS operations in the region.<sup>19</sup> Besides North Korea, the last inter-state conflict in the region occurred over 35 years ago between Vietnam and Cambodia, which transpired before the non-aggression pact was signed between ASEAN member states. These facts illustrate that inter-state conflict is not the norm as states find other methods short of war to settle their disputes. As a result, USPACOM should devote its few U.S. Army RABs to focus on performing stability mechanisms.

Similarly, countries within the USPACOM AOR currently confront more internal divisions and security threats as compared to their external aspirations and desires that might threaten a neighbor and result in a conventional war. The largest threats in Indonesia are the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) transnational terrorist organization and the historical insurgency in the Aceh region. Thailand continues to confront an insurgency on their southern border with Malaysia, which has taken more Thai military lives in one year than the U.S. military lost in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup> Just last year Malaysia fought another armed conflict with the insurgent group associated with the Sultan of Sulu over the Sabah region of Borneo. Since 1972 the Philippines have struggled against the insurgency led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

---

18. Benson, *Major Combat Operations versus Stability Operations: Getting Army Priorities Correct*, 49.

19. Bruce W. Bennett, "Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, *RAND Corporation*, 2013, [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND\\_RR331.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf), 7.

20. Anthony Davis, "South Thai Insurgency Sees Higher Casualties in 2013, Govt Report Says," *HIS Jane's Defence Weekly*, last modified January 2, 2014, accessed April 24, 2014, <http://www.janes.com/article/32031/south-thai-insurgency-sees-higher-casualties-in-2013-govt-report-says>, 100.

(MILF) in Mindanao, in addition to their issues with the Islamic extremist organization called the Abu Sayyaf Group. These few examples begin to demonstrate the number and magnitude of these intra-state issues that USPACOM countries have dealt with in the past, struggle with in the present, and will continue to confront into the future. Each internal country threat is of interest to the USPACOM commander because they threaten the stability of not just one country, but possibly the surrounding countries and the region.

It is incumbent upon the USPACOM commander to provide the assistance necessary to keep each country in a phase zero status; where stability is the primary concern and focus.<sup>21</sup> While this is primarily the responsibility of the host nation, other U.S. Government agencies can and do play a role, therefore it should also be part of the strategy for the USPACOM commander. The USPACOM strategy, states that “our desired end state is that the Asia-Pacific is secure and prosperous.”<sup>22</sup> In order to achieve this end state USPACOM’s approach should be to apply stability mechanisms, not defeat mechanisms in its AOR. As such, U.S. Army doctrine states that “the preponderant core competency determines the choice of defeat or stability mechanisms to describe how friendly forces accomplish the assigned mission. Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for CAM, while stability mechanisms are best suited for WAS.”<sup>23</sup> Stated more succinctly, the current environment in the USPACOM theater of operations requires more stability operations and thus demands the majority of training emphasis.

---

21. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07.3: Peace Operations*, Washington DC: CJCS, 1 August 2012, B-8.

22. U.S. Pacific Command, <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/2013-uspacom-strategy.shtml>.

23. U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 2-9.

## **Operational Factors**

One's freedom of action is achieved primarily by properly balancing the factors of space, time, and force.<sup>24</sup> In regards to space, while it is important for RABs to learn about the physical environments of the countries that one day they may have to operate in, what is more important is that they learn about the human-space of those areas. More and more wars are fought in and around the human-space, which is vital to win the peace and achieve the strategic objectives. Human-space "includes such elements as the political system and nature of government, population size and density, economic activity, transportation, trade, ideologies, ethnicity, religions, social structure and traditions, culture, and technology."<sup>25</sup> Therefore, dedicating the time to understand the human-space within the USPACOM AOR is the most important aspect for a RAB. Having the knowledge of the political system, institutions, economic situation, ethnicities, religious beliefs, culture, tradition, etc. are critical aspects that the U.S. Army must start learning now in order to meet the strategic vision of the U.S. in the region now and into the future.

The second factor that when analyzed points to the use of a WAS approach towards the USPACOM AOR is that of regional forces. As the U.S. reduces its force size over the next five years it must compensate in other ways in order to achieve U.S. interests around the world. The most obvious way to compensate is to partner with other forces to increase U.S. combat potential. "Partnership is a force multiplier as partner capacity is built . . . it is a

---

24. Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009, III-3.

25. Ibid., III-7.



bridge to help strengthen the largest and most powerful military force in the world.”<sup>26</sup> In order to reduce the risk to a smaller force, the U.S. must compensate through a combination of historic and new regional partnerships in the USPACOM AOR. Partnerships are built on trust which occurs over time and cannot be surged.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it requires a systemic long term investment in a combination of tasks such as security cooperation, security assistance and language training, amongst others to achieve the trust which leads to a secure and lasting partnership. There are numerous benefits to partnerships which include gaining access, improved readiness, increased interoperability, upgraded partner capacity, and a willingness to work together.<sup>28</sup> This investment into regional partnerships will increase the trust between militaries and will enhance U.S. combat power now and well into the future.

To further illustrate the necessity of increasing the force size through partnership can be seen through an analysis of the State Partnership Program (SPP). The purpose of the SPP is to “enhance military-military and civil-military proficiency in security and stability operations while performing critical security cooperation activities for Combatant Commanders.”<sup>29</sup> Traditionally, the U.S. Army has aligned National Guard Brigades with countries as part of the SPP. However, when all the Geographic Combatant Commands

---

26. David Majury, *The National Guard's State Partnerships: Security Cooperation and Force Multiplier*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, 2.

27. Karen Parrish, “Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says,” *American Forces Press Service*, last modified January 29, 2013, accessed May 2, 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119137>.

28. Michael Hartmayer, and John Hansen, “Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy,” *Military Review*, January-February 2013.

29. Majury, *The National Guard's State Partnerships: Security Cooperation and Force Multiplier*, 1.

(GCCs) are analyzed, USPACOM is tied for the least number of assigned Army Combat and/or Maneuver Enhancement Brigades with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in this program.<sup>30</sup> Considering that USPACOM is now the top priority for the U.S. this clearly shows a deficiency in the force structure. Therefore, aligning Active Duty RABs in USPACOM is the ideal course of action to rectify this imbalance between lack of forces and U.S. strategic priorities.

Another element of force structure that supports a focus on WAS training over CAM is the relatively small number of Army forces aligned to USPACOM when compared with the numbers required to defeat a conventional threat in the region. Currently there is one Corps Headquarters, two Division Headquarters, nine Brigade Combat Teams, and two combat aviation brigades allocated to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), however, those same units are still being utilized in the CENTCOM area in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>31</sup> Even when all these units are solely dedicated to USPACOM, that force size pales in comparison to the quantity of ground forces in the region. Joseph Stalin is credited with saying that “quantity has a quality all of its own,” and that statement echoes throughout Asia because of the size of its populations and militaries.<sup>32</sup> As mentioned earlier, seven of the ten largest armies reside in the Pacific Theater and there are not enough U.S. ground

---

30. Edward S. Smith, *Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, 19.

31. Michelle Tan, “Army ramps up Pacific exercises, training,” *The Army Times*, last modified December 12, 2012, accessed May 2, 2014, <http://www.armytimes.com/article/20121212/NEWS/212120313/Army-ramps-up-Pacific-exercises-training>.

32. Daniel Goure, “Sequestration, The U.S. Military and the Value of Quantity,” *Early Warning Blog*, February 6, 2013, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/sequestration-the-u-s-military-and-the-value-of-quantity/>.

forces allocated to USARPAC to defeat a conventional threat. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the USPACOM Commander to prevent conventional warfare through stability operations using the relatively few RABs assigned to it. In the event that a conventional war does break out, USPACOM must buy time in order to allow additional Army forces to deploy and meet that threat.

The factor of time is arguably the most important of the three based on the inability to regain time.<sup>33</sup> “The key to success is to shorten the time for estimating the situation, making a decision, and deploying and maneuvering one’s combat forces.”<sup>34</sup> It is here where the balancing of the space and forces discussed above becomes self-evident. First, understanding the human-space shortens the time necessary to make the right operational decisions. Additionally, if and when U.S. Army RABs are employed it shortens their time to understand the space dynamics and therefore their preparation time, which is critical. Moreover, the time required to deploy and build up enough U.S. Army forces to oppose a short notice conventional threat in the region may be too long to be effective based on the distance and logistical assets required. However, the forces added through partnership and their proximity to the region can significantly reduce the response time, provide the U.S. access, and provide the time for U.S. units to deploy in order to successfully stabilize and/or defeat a threat.

### **Conclusion**

U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Brigades assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command should focus the majority of their training on WAS operations in order to promote the stability and prosperity required by the USPACOM commander’s Theater Campaign Plan.

---

33. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, III-19.

34. Ibid., III-19.

The historical training pattern for the U.S. Army of preparing for the next CAM war must finally be broken. The current threat environment, partnerships, and U.S. national interests in the USPACOM region allow for RABs to focus their training on WAS. Finally, the analysis of the factors of space, time, and force solidify the training balance in favor of WAS in the near term over CAM. This training balance will allow the USPACOM Commander to apply its theater strategy now and well into the future while simultaneously balancing the risks associated with such a strategy.

### **Recommendations**

As a result of this study on the training balance for USPACOM Regionally Aligned Brigades, three principal recommendations are offered. First, training USPACOM assigned brigades primarily for WAS operations does present a risk that not all commanders are willing to accept. To alleviate the risk concerns, Regionally Aligned Brigades must focus their training strategies on tasks that are dual purpose. Put another way, brigades must train those WAS tasks that simultaneously cover CAM tasks as well.<sup>35</sup> By adopting this dual purpose training strategy, Regionally Aligned Brigades will be more flexible and capable of conducting any mission across the Range of Military Operations.

Second, with the traditional role of the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Centers returning to a CAM training focus, an in-depth analysis into the creation of a new Combat Training Center (CTC) focused on WAS should be researched.<sup>36</sup> The U.S. Army needs a dedicated CTC to maintain training knowledge, expertise, as well as lessons learned in regards to WAS type operations. Over the last ten years both training

---

35. Hawkins, *Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges*, 39.

36. Ibid., 40.

centers morphed from CAM to WAS, but the conversion was too slow. Therefore a separate training center keeps the Army agile and adaptive by maintaining the most realistic training environment the service has to offer for each core competency.

Finally, the U.S. Army must maintain brigades that are not regionally aligned to any combatant commander. Therefore, the U.S. Army must retain enough brigades to maintain its flexibility throughout all six GCCs. A very likely scenario is that all Regionally Aligned Brigades end up focusing their training towards WAS operations since the cultural and linguistic differences are so vast between and even within each GCCs. “The drawback to such specific training is that regionally aligned CAM/COIN units essentially become extra-specialized, which is a plus for effectiveness but an obvious drawback for flexibility.”<sup>37</sup> By keeping some brigades in reserve and monitoring the training focus of the Regionally Aligned Brigades, the U.S. Army could then focus the training of the remainder of the force towards CAM operations, which are less sensitive to regional differences.<sup>38</sup>

---

37. Griffin, “Regionally Aligned Brigades: There’s More to this Plan than Meets the Eye.”

38. Ibid.

## Selected Bibliography

- Bennett, Bruce W. "Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. *RAND Corporation*. 2013. Accessed April 9, 2014.  
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND\\_RR331.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf).
- Benson, William. *Major Combat Operations versus Stability Operations: Getting Army Priorities Correct*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2011.
- Berteau, David, Michael J. Green, Gregory, T. Kiley, Nicholas F. Szechenyi, Ernest Z. Bower, Victor Cha, Karl F. Inderfurth, Christopher K. Johnson, Gary A. Powell, Stephanie Sanok. *U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2012.
- Blanton, James. *Finding the Balance to Combat a Hybrid Threat*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2013.
- Davis, Anthony. "South Thai Insurgency Sees Higher Casualties in 2013, Govt Report Says." *HIS Jane's Defence Weekly*. Last modified January 2, 2014. Accessed April 24, 2014. <http://www.janes.com/article/32031/south-thai-insurgency-sees-higher-casualties-in-2013-govt-report-says>.
- Griffin, Steve. "Regionally Aligned Brigades: There's More to this Plan than Meets the Eye." *Small Wars Journal*. Last Modified September 19, 2012. Accessed March 28, 2014. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/regionally-aligned-brigades-theres-more-to-this-plan-than-meets-the-eye>.
- Goure, Daniel. "Sequestration, the U.S. Military and the Value of Quantity." *Early Warning Blog*. Last modified February 6, 2013. Accessed April 9, 2014. <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/sequestration-the-u-s-military-and-the-value-of-quantity/>.
- Hartmayer, Michael, and John Hansen. "Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy." *Military Review*, January-February 2013.
- Hawkins, Jerome. *Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21st Century Challenges*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2008.
- Jones, Brian. *What are the Risks of Building a High Tech, Narrowly Focused Army?* Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1996.
- Lai, David. *The United States and China in Power Transition*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011.

- Locklear, Samuel. *U.S. Pacific Command Posture*. Presentation before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, March 5, 2013.
- Majury, David B. *The National Guard's State Partnerships: Security Cooperation and Force Multiplier*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013.
- Parrish, Karen. "Special Operators Depend on Good Partners, Commander Says." *American Forces Press Service*. Last modified January 29, 2013. Accessed May 2, 2014. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119137>.
- Odierno, Raymond. *Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review*. 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Committee on the Armed Services United States House of Representatives, September 18, 2014.
- Sheeran, Morgan. "Approaching Doctrinal Training the Army Way." *Small Wars Journal*. Last modified September 10, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2014. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/534-sheeran.pdf>.
- Smith, Edward S. *Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012.
- Stewart, Richard. *American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003*. Accessed April 9, 2014. Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2005. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/chapter12.htm>.
- Tan, Michelle. "Army Ramps up Pacific Exercises, Training." *The Army Times*. Last modified December 12, 2012. Accessed May 2, 2014. <http://www.armytimes.com/article/20121212/NEWS/212120313/Army-ramps-up-Pacific-exercises-training>.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Training Circulation 7-100: Hybrid Threat*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010.
- U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations*. Washington DC: CJCS, 29 September 2011.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Joint Publication 3-07.3: Peace Operations*. Washington DC: CJCS, 1 August 2012.
- U.S. Pacific Command. Accessed March 19, 2014. <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/2013-uspacom-strategy.shtml>.

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009.

Yates, Lawrence A. *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006.